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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that workers who reach retirement age should enjoy
certain benefits is not a new one by any stretch of the imagination.
One author has stated that industrial pension plans go back as far
as 1875.' Many private plans have developed since that time, and
these new developments have been followed by an extensive amount
of legislation. One of the most important pieces of legislation re-
lating to pension plans is the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).2
ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974. Its purpose is to protect
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their ben-
eficiaries by requiring plan fiduciaries to meet certain recording,
disclosure, and funding standards and by providing for appropriate
remedies through ready access to the federal courts.3 ERISA contains
several sections which are all designed to achieve the foregoing pur-
pose, 4 but the section which is probably most effective in promoting
1. Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FoRsT L. REv. 219,
220 (1975).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1462 (1982).
3. Id.
4. For a comprehensive look at the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see Snyder,
supra note 1.
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the goals expressed by Congress is the section known as the pre-
emption statute. The preemption statute reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under 1003(b) of this title. This
section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.6
The power of Congress to enact the section 1144(a) preemption
statute comes from Article VI of the federal Constitution. 7 The in-
tention of Congress to preempt state law with ERISA is clear from
the language of the subsection. However, the intention of Congress
under subsection (b)(1) of 29 U.S.C. 1144 is not as clear.
Section 1144(b)(1) states the preemption statute's effective date,
and reads: "This section shall not apply with respect to any cause
of action which arose, or any act or omission which occurred, before
January 1, 1975." 8 Although the language of the statute is not com-
plex, it has been the subject of much dispute in recent years and
has left the circuit courts in a near perfect dichotomy. 9 The situation
in which the issue of how to apply section 1144(b) usually arises is
when an employee has begun to participate in a private pension plan
prior to the January 1, 1975 date, and the employee has later filed
an application for benefits and had them denied sometime after the
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982).
6. Id. § 1144(a).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1982).
9. At the present time seven circuits have applied the statute in a retroactive fashion with two
of the seven doing so indirectly. Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1989);
Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986);
Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 769 F.2d 140 (3rd Cir. 1985); Coward v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); Peckham v. Bd. of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1981); Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan, 637 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1981); Winer v. Edison Bros.
Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979). Four circuits have taken the opposite view and
have refused to apply the statute retroactively. Lamontagne v. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension
Fund, 869 F.2d 153 (2nd Cir. 1989); Vaughter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d 685 (11th Cir.
1987); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984); Quinn v. Country
Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 92
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January 1, 1975 effective date. In this situation, the federal courts
have laid out a two-prong test for determining whether ERISA ap-
plies. 10 The first prong tests whether the cause of action arose before
January 1, 1975. There has not been much controversy over the first
prong of the test. However, there has been a large amount of con-
troversy over the application of the second prong of the test which
asks whether any act or omission occurred before January 1, 1975.
In applying the second prong, some courts have taken a narrow
view" of the phrase "acts or omissions," holding that the denial
of benefits is the act or omission for purposes of the statute, while
other courts have taken a more expansive or "broad" view of the
phrase, holding that any act which relates to the cause of action is
an act or omission for the purposes of the statute.' 2
This article will present an analysis of the dichotomous views
held by the federal circuit courts on the issue of whether the federal
judiciary may review pre-ERISA pension plans when the denial of
benefits occurs after the enactment of ERISA. More specifically,
this article will present and analyze the position the courts have taken
in deciding what is an "act or omission" for purposes of section
1144(b)(1). First, it will discuss those decisions which have held that
the denial of benefits is the "act or omission" for purposes of sec-
tion 1144(b)(1). Next, it will examine those decisions which have
held that any act or omission relating to the denial of benefits is
the "act or omission" for purposes of section 1144(b)(1). Finally,
it will attempt to predict the position the United States Supreme
10. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 71.
11. At this time a clarification of the term "narrow view" is needed. Section 1144(b)(1) contains
the phrase "act or omission." The term "narrow" is used because the courts that take this view
hold that the only act or omission that is relevant for purposes of the statute is the formal denial
of pension benefits. Therefore, the court is limiting or narrowing the kinds of acts or omissions that
can be considered in applying the statute. It is a narrow view of "act or omission." It should also
be noted that § 1144(b)(1) is a limitation on ERISA protection because it limits the application of
the act by setting an effective date. Therefore, a court that takes a narrow view of § 1144(b)(1) is
actually expanding the protection of the act as a whole. The opposite view which states that any act
or omission before 1975 is an "act or omission" for purposes of § 1144 (b)(1) will be referred to
ai the "broad view" for purposes of this article. The same logic is used in defining the broad view
as was used in defining the narrow view above. Thus, the court which employs the broad view of
§ I144(b)(1) is actually contracting the scope of the act's protection.
12. See supra note 9.
1990]
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Court will ultimately assume if it should decide to address the issue
at hand.
II. Ti NARIow ViEw
A slight majority of the federal circuit courts have taken a nar-
row view of the phrase "act or omission." Under the narrow view,
these courts have held that the formal denial of pension benefits is
the crucial act which determines whether ERISA applies under sec-
tion 1144(b)(1). 13
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit to
address this issue in the 1979 case Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores
Pension Plan.14 In Winer, former employees were denied pension
benefits under a provision in their plans known as a "Bad Boy"' 5
clause. The employees' alleged misconduct, used by their employers
to deny their benefits, involved the receipt of kickbacks from various
suppliers in the period prior to the enactment of ERISA. However,
the formal denial of the employees' benefits came in July of 1976,
one and a half years after the enactment of ERISA.' 6 The pension
plan argued that the dishonest conduct of the employees occurred
before 1975 and that, therefore, ERISA was not applicable to the
case at bar. 17 However, the court did not agree. The court held
ERISA applicable because no event had occurred at the time of the
alleged kickbacks which could have served as a basis for a claim
under ERISA. 8 The court reasoned that Congress could not have
meant that if any act or omission relevant to the cause of action
occurred prior to January 1, 1975, state law would control. 9 The
court further stated that such an interpretation would be inimical
to the congressional attempt to extend the protection of ERISA to.
13. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all hold this view.
See supra note 9.
14. 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979).
15. A "Bad Boy" clause is a clause in a pension contract that disqualifies a member from
receiving benefits if he commits certain acts such as being dishonest with respect to the assets of the
business or if the person is convicted of a felony while he is an employee.
16. Winer, 593 F.2d at 309.
17. Id. at 312.
18. Id. at 314.
19. Id. at 313.
[Vol. 92
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all employees as soon as practicable. 2° The Eighth Circuit is not
alone in its interpretation of section 1144(b)(1).
In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
followed the view taken by the Eighth Circuit in Paris v. Profit
Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc. 21 That case
also involved a situation where the pension plan was started before
January 1, 1975, but the denial of benefits came after January 1,
1975.2 The court, in concluding that it had federal jurisdiction, held
that for purposes of ERISA a cause of action does not accrue until
an application has been denied.2 1 In giving the reasons for its de-
cision, the court quoted a 1947 Supreme Court case which stated
that claims filed before a pension actually has been denied might
be challenged for lack of ripeness. 24 The Fifth Circuit also reasoned
that to hold otherwise would place an almost intolerable burden on
employees covered by pension plans.25 The court further stated that
a contrary ruling would require individuals who are unversed in the
law to be constantly vigilant and would also require piecemeal chal-
lenges before an actual denial has occurred, resulting in a "great
waste of judicial resources. ' '26
More recently the Seventh Circuit has also addressed this issue
in Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.27 The Coward case dealt with
a factual situation similar to the cases discussed above. The pension
plan in Coward was a voluntary plan which required contributions
from the participating employees and the company.28 The initial plan
was started in 1943 and was amended in 1971 to retroactively rec-
ognize pension benefits of employees who had been continuously
employed. 29 The plaintiffs instituted this action to recover past ben-
20. Id.
21. 637 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 359.
23. Id. at 361.
24. United Public Works v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25. Paris, 637 F.2d at 361.
26. Id.
27. 686 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at, 1232.
29. Id.
1990]
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efits. Their application for past benefits was denied in 1976.30 The
pension plan company argued that the claim was not subject to
ERISA.31 The Seventh Circuit held that the critical act for federal
jurisdictional purposes of ERISA was the denial of plaintiffs' ap-
plications for pension benefit credits. 32 The court closely followed
the reasoning in Paris and Winer.31
In Tanzillo v. Local Union 17, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,34 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the
narrow view by holding that the act or omission giving rise to this
action was the post-ERISA denial of an employees pension by the
fund in 1981. 35 Although the court acknowledged a contrary view
held by the Ninth Circuit in Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. ,36 it chose not to follow the Ninth Circuit's lead. Instead, the
court was more persuaded by the Menhorn dissent 37 which reasoned
that while the determination of a claim upon the fund may require
the fund trustees to consider events that have taken place before
ERISA's enactment, the act of granting or denying a pension nev-
ertheless involves a contemporaneous construction of the plan's pro-
visions-an "act or omission" to which ERISA's fiduciary standards
apply, and by extension, over which the district courts are un-
questionably given jurisdiction.38 The Tanzillo court also noted that
an identical conclusion had been reached by another panel of the
Third Circuit in Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,39 which
held that ERISA's jurisdiction extends to claims based upon events
occurring long before ERISA's effective date, so long as the cause
of action arises after ERISA's effective date. 40
30. Id. at 1234.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 769 F.2d 140 (3rd Cir. 1985).
35. Id. at 144.
36. 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that certain acts before the 1975 date constituted
"acts or omissions" for the purpose of § 1144(b)(1) even though the denial of benefits did not come
until after that date).
37. 738 F.2d at 1508 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
38. 769 F.2d at 144.
39. 765 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1985).
40. Tanzillo, 769 F.2d at 144.
[Vol. 92
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss3/6
ERISA INTERPRETATION
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue for the first time in the
1989 case Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust.41 The court in Rod-
riguez acknowledged that there was a conflict among the circuits
where a plaintiff's application for pension benefits is made and de-
nied post-ERISA, but at least some acts have occurred pre-ERISA. 42
After examining both views the court adopted the view expressed
by the Tanzillo court 43 and held that the denial of benefits is the
act or omission for purposes of section 1144(b)(1). The court also
cited Winer.44 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a narrow approach
has the advantage of certainty over the broad view.45 Therefore,
courts need only look to the date of the trustees' determination in
order to decide whether ERISA applies. 46 The court also noted that
plan participants cannot be expected to inquire about benefits until
retirement.47
Although they have not specifically addressed the issue, two other
courts have indirectly applied ERISA to similar situations. 48 In Peck-
ham v. Board Trustees,49 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
ERISA to a claim in which many critical acts had occurred before
the January 1, 1975 date, but the formal denial of benefits did not
take place until 1976.0 The court did not specifically address the
issue of ERISA jurisdiction, but instead it applied ERISA to the
merits of the case without any mention of section 1144(b)(1). In
essence, the court presumed jurisdiction from the start. In a similar
situation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
applied ERISA to a claim in which many of the crucial acts had
occurred prior to the January 1, 1975 effective date in Central States
S.E. & S.W. Areas v. Kraftco, Inc.51 Although the court acknowl-
41. 872 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 72.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Rodriguez, 872 F.2d at 72.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir.
1986); Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
50. Id. at 425.
51. 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986).
1990]
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edged that section 1144(b)(1) provides a limitation on claims, it sim-
ply stated that this section did not provide any further guidelines
as to statutes of limitations on claims.52 The court then assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case without any discussion of whether
it had the authority to do so or not. Although the primary reason
for the court's failure to discuss the application of section 1144(b)(1)
may have been that the parties never brought up the issue, the court
nevertheless could have raised the issue itself as it did in the Tanzill 5 3
case, but significantly did not. Although the narrow view taken by
the courts in the cases discussed above has merit, there is a contrary
view which has also received some attention.
III. THE BROAD VIEw
Some of the circuits have taken a broad view of the phrase "act
or omission," holding that any act or omission that relates to the
cause of action may bar an employee from the protection of ER-
ISA.54
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted
the broad view in Quinn v. County Soda Company.5 5 That case
involved a situation where many of the critical acts had occurred
prior to 1975. Those acts included such things as oral representations
by the company to the employee that he was not included in the
plan and that he would not be made a participant in the plan.56 The
court stated that the trustees, in denying the employee benefits, were
simply following through on a position consistently taken and com-
municated to the plaintiff from the time the plan was established.57
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff's basic quarrel was with
a policy and course of conduct instituted, fully delineated, and com-
municated to him many years prior to 1975, and, therefore, the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this suit.5 8 The
52. Id. at 1104.
53. Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 769 F.2d 140, 143 (3rd Cir. 1985).
54. The First, Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits hold this view.
55. 639 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 841.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 92
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court reasoned that the clear practical import of the act or omission
clause is to prevent past conduct of pension plan fiduciaries and
contributors from being judged retroactively under the standards of
ERISA simply because the conduct generates consequences subse-
quent to the ERISA effective date that give rise to what is technically
an independent "cause of action."' 59 Therefore, the court felt that
it would be adverse to congressional intent to apply ERISA in this
situation.60
Perhaps the landmark case adopting the broad view is Menhorn
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,61 which was decided in 1984 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Menhorn
case involved a situation where an employee worked for several years,
resigned in 1967, was rehired one month later and worked until he
was laid off in 1980. The employee then filed for benefits and was
denied them because he had not worked fifteen continuous years;
therefore, he had no vested benefits. The employee brought suit
under ERISA. The court held that the denial of benefits in 1980
was simply the "inexorable consequence" of the position Firestone
had taken years before. 62 The court also held that because all of the
relevant conduct on which liability must be based occurred prior to
1975, state law and not ERISA must control. 63 The Ninth Circuit
also noted that in cases where a claimant has been formally denied
benefits after ERISA's effective date pursuant to an unambiguous
and non-discretionary plan provision adopted before the effective
date, the denial is not reviewable under ERISAA4 The court qualified
this holding somewhat by stating that "the case at bar must be
distinguished from those in which benefits have been denied as a
result of a significant act of discretion under an interpretation of
the plan which took place after ERISA's effective date.' '65 This lan-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 738 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Note, Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,The
Ninth Circuit's Resolution of the Jurisdictional Conflicts Contained In The Employee Income Re-
tirement Security Act of 1974, 21 WumAmETTE L. REv. 921 (1985).
62. Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1502.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1501.
65. Id. at 1502.
1990]
9
H.: Post-Erisa Interpretation of Pre-Erisa Pension Plans: Dissention
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
guage seems to suggest that the Ninth Circuit would hold differently
in other factual situations.
The Second Circuit subsequently followed the Menhorn rationale
in the 1989 case, Lamantagne v. Pension Plan of the United Wire,
Metal and Machine Pension Fund.6 6 In Lamantagne, the Second
Circuit dealt with a situation where an employee worked from 1954
to 1971.67 In 1971 the employee injured his back and never returned
to work. 8 In 1978 he applied for benefits and was denied on the
basis of a "break in employment" 69 clause. The court held that the
relevant act for section 1144(b)(1) purposes - the adoption of the
break in employment policy-occurred before 1975, and therefore
the fiduciary standards section of ERISA does not apply to the
employee's claim.70 Here the court found that the relevant act for
the purposes of ERISA was the break in employment. 71 The court
also cited Menhorn in stating that the post-1975 denial of his ap-
plication for a pension was the direct result of the employer's pre-
1975 adoption of a "break-in-service" policy and its warnings to
him that a break in employment would terminate his previously
earned credits.
One other court has also followed this view in a less direct fash-
ion. In Vaughter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,72 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit faced a situation in which pilots
were involved with a voluntary contribution pension plan. The plan
had begun in 1947. In 1965, Eastern assumed the burden of funding
the pension program for its pilots. Under the terms of the program,
contributors were entitled to returns of their contributions only in
the event of death or termination of employment. In 1979 Eastern
entered into an agreement whereby the airline agreed to return vol-
66. 869 F.2d 153 (2nd Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 154.
68. Id.
69. A "break in employment" clause "is a provision in a pension plan that states that an
employee must work a certain number of hours within a certain time period. If the employee fails
to achieve the stated number of hours he or she will lose credit for pension benefits." Id. at 154-
55.
70. Id. at 156.
71. Id.
72. 817 F.2d 685 (1lth Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 92
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untary contributions to non-pilot employees. In 1980 Vaughter, a
pilot, filed for his own contributions and was denied. The court
stated that the plaintiff's claims had accrued in 1965, that the accrual
of his claims constituted the relevant act for purposes of section
1144(b) and that his claims were therefore not cognizable under ER-
ISA.73 Although the pilots claimed that they could not have known
about the return of payments until the 1979 agreement, the court
flatly rejected their argument and denied their ERISA claim. 74
IV. THE VIEW THE UNITED STATES SUPRiEME COURT WILL
LIKELY FOLLOW
Although the above discussion has given an insight into how the
circuit courts have dealt with the issue in the past, it has not given
any indication of how the conflict is to be resolved.
The conflict among the circuits is likely to lead to a future Su-
preme Court decision. However, certiorari has been denied four times
to date.75 Currently, the United States Supreme Court has not so
much as cited 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) in any of its opinions. How-
ever, it has written about section 1144(a), which is the general pre-
emption statute. Although the Court's analysis of section 1144(a)
will not answer the question of how it might deal with section
1144(b)(1), it does provide some insight as to how the Court deals
with ERISA and retirement issues generally. One of the most helpful
cases for understanding the Supreme Court's view on the general
issue of ERISA pre-emption is Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. De-
deaux, 76 which was decided in 1987 by a unanimous Court.
77
The respondent in Dedeaux hurt his back on the job in 1975.78
At the time, he was working for Entex, and he had acquired a long-
73. Id. at 691.
74. Id. at 692.
75. Lamontagne v. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 72 (1989); Jameson
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Pension Plan, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
460 U.S. 1070 (1983); Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
76. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
77. The Dedeaux Court included all the members of the present Supreme Court except Justice
Kennedy. The present members of the Supreme Court are Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan,
Anthony M. Kennedy, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia, John Paul Stevens, and Byron R. White.
78. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 43.
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term disability employee benefit from the petitioner-employer. 79 The
respondent-employee sought benefits from the plan which were in-
itially granted and then terminated after two years.80 During the next
three years, respondent's benefits were reinstated and terminated
several times.8' The respondent instituted a diversity action against
petitioner on tort and contract claims, but did not assert any ERISA
claims.82 The district court granted summary judgment for petitioner
on the grounds that the claims were pre-empted by ERISA.83 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.84 The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that ERISA pre-empted the state law claims.85 The
Court noted that the pre-emption provisions of ERISA are delib-
erately expansive and designed to establish pension plan regulation
as an exclusively federal concern.86 The Court also quoted Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.87 in stating:
The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause,
applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.
The Conference Committee rejected these provisions in favor of the present lan-
guage and indicated that the section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its lan-
guageA'
The Court further quoted from comments made by sponsors of the
original bill:
It should be stressed with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the sub-
stantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to
pre-empt the field for federal regulations, thus examining the threat of conflicting
or inconsistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle
is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of state or local govern-
ments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.',
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 43-44.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 46.
87. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
88. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 46 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 89).
89. Id. at 46 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
[Vol. 92
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In driving the point home, the Court stated that it agreed with the
argument made by the Solicitor General:
Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ER-
ISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions taken by ERISA-plan participants
and beneficiaries ... and that varying state causes of action for claims within
the scope of § 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of
Congress.9
Dedeaux makes it clear that the Court believes that ERISA should
be applied expansively for the purpose of furthering congressional
intent. Likewise, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,9' the
Supreme Court followed this same rationale. The Metropolitan case
involved a pension plan set up by General Motors Corporation. 92
The plan was insured by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 93
Arthur Taylor was a General Motors employee who hurt his back
on the job. 94 Taylor filed a supplemental claim for benefits and was
sent to an orthopedist. 95 General Motors also requested that Taylor
be examined by the company's medical department.9 6 In both ex-
aminations, it was concluded that Taylor was not disabled. 97 Taylor
refused to return to work and was terminated.98 Taylor filed suit
against General Motors and Metropolitan on the grounds of breach
of contract and wrongful termination. 99 General Motors removed
the case to federal court alleging federal question jurisdiction over
benefit claims by virtue of ERISA. 10 The district court agreed with
General Motors but the Court of Appeals reversed.10' The Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that common law
contract and tort claims are pre-empted by ERISA 0 2 Both of these
90. Id. at 52.
91. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 61.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 62.
102. Id.
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cases demonstrate a clear intent by the court to expand the pro-
visions of ERISA as far as possible. However, there are cases where
the Court has not encouraged jurisdictional expansion of ERISA.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts,10 3 the Supreme
Court declined to apply ERISA. That case dealt with a situation
where a Massachusetts statute required that minimum mental health
care benefits be provided to a Massachusetts resident who was in-
sured under a general health insurance policy or an employee health
care plan.? 4 The appellant insurer contended that the statute, as
applied to insurance policies purchased by employers, violated ER-
ISA. 05 The Court held that the statute merely regulated insurance
and was not pre-empted by ERISA, as it applies to insurance con-
tracts purchased for plans subject to ERISA. 06 However, the Court
did acknowledge that the scope of ERISA pre-emption is broad. 107
The opinion also noted the duty to further congressional intent. 08
In the more recent case, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,19
the Court also declined to apply ERISA. In Coyne, handed down
in 1987, the appellant-employer closed its plant and laid off most
of its employees." 0 The Director of the Maine Bureau of Labor
Standards filed suit to enforce the provisions of a state statute re-
quiring employers in the event of a plant closing to provide a one-
time severance payment to employees not covered by an express
contract providing for severance pay."' The state superior court
granted summary judgment for the Director, and the Supreme Court
of Maine affirmed, rejecting the argument that the statute was pre-
empted by ERISA."2 The Supreme Court of the United States held
that "the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA ... because the
statute neither establishes nor requires an employer to maintain an
103. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 758.
107. Id. at 739.
108. Id. at 738 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
109. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id. at 6.
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employee benefit plan under that federal statute. 113 The Court noted
that ERISA is not applicable to all employee benefits, but only to
benefit plans.11 4 The Court also reasoned that "concern only arises
... with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an
ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's obliga-
tion." '
Although the Court declined to apply ERISA, this case is easily
distinguished from those cases in which the Court chose to apply
ERISA. Coyne dealt with a statutorily mandated severance payment,
rather than a comprehensive employer-originated benefit plan of the
type involved in the cases which have interpreted section 1144(b)(1).
The latter cases, without doubt, involved an employer-established
"benefit plan." That fact alone greatly distinguishes Coyne for our
purposes. Even with the factual situation as it was in Coyne, Justices
White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia strongly dissented." 6 The
dissent argued that the Court's "administrative scheme" rationale
provides states with a means of circumventing congressional intent
clearly expressed in section 1144, to pre-empt all state laws that relate
to employer benefit plans." 7 The dissenting Justices would have ap-
plied ERISA even in the factual setting of Coyne.
The cases discussed above show the Court's willingness to expand
the pre-emption of ERISA. It would also seem logical that the Court
would be willing to take the view that the formal denial of benefits
constitutes the "acts or omissions" for the purposes of section
1144(b)(1). This view would afford more employees the protection
of ERISA and would therefore further the congressional intent of
protecting employees who are covered under qualified plans.
It is difficult to see how congressional intent will be upheld if
the Court takes a contrary position. For example, if the view is
taken that an act or omission may bar ERISA claims, then many
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Coyne, 482 U.S. at 23 (Vhite, J., dissenting) (also joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
and Scalia).
117. Id. at 26.
1990]
15
H.: Post-Erisa Interpretation of Pre-Erisa Pension Plans: Dissention
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
employees will not be subject to the protection of ERISA. Any em-
ployee who is participating in a plan in which he or she started
before 1975 will be in a kind of limbo. If twenty years from the
present date the person applies for benefits, the Court could possibly
deny the claim as a pre-1975 act. Thus, an employee may incorrectly
believe that his or her retirement pension is intact throughout years
of employment, and fail to provide for his or her retirement in some
other way. Clearly this is not what Congress intended. Although
past opinions are important in predicting the outcome of possible
future Supreme Court decisions, there are also other factors that
should be considered.
One of these considerations is the age of the justices. Six of the
justices are over 65 years of age, and three of those six are over
age 80.118 This factor alone indicates that several of the justices may
be somewhat sympathetic to protecting retirement benefits. The age
factor may not have a conscious effect, but it is bound to play a
role in the Court's decision.
Another factor which may play a role in the decision is the in-
equity that is bound to result if the broad view is taken. If the
Court rules with the narrow view, anyone who is denied benefits
after January 1, 1975, will be subject to the protection of ERISA.
This would create certainty which would not come about under the
broad view. However, if the Supreme Court should decide to accept
the broad view and allow any act or omission before 1975 to bar
claims to ERISA, the only certainty that will be achieved is that
every citizen will be subject to the same rule. But the problem is
that the broad rule itself creates uncertainty. For example, if the
Supreme Court adopts the broad rule, it will be left to the trial
courts to decide which acts or omissions shall bar the claim and
which ones will not. It would be impossible for the Supreme Court
to make a comprehensive list of those that. will and those that will
not. Therefore, it would then be possible that a worker in one circuit
or district would be denied ERISA protection because he was de-
linquent on a payment to his plan before 1975 and yet a worker
118. Years of birth for the six justices over age 65 are: Brennan 1906, Blackmun 1908, Marshall
1908, White 1911, Stevens 1920, Rehnquist 1924.
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from another circuit or district would be granted ERISA protection
in the exact same factual situation because the separate courts had
differing views as to what would qualify as an act or omission. Thus,
inequities are bound to result from adoption of the broad view.
Furthermore, such a rule would also increase litigation because em-
ployers and employees would not be sure whether the specific event
in controversy would qualify as an act or omission for the purpose
of ERISA claims. This would only lead to more cases and more
appeals.
Although most of the discussion above indicates that the Su-
preme Court is likely to adopt the narrow view, there is at least
one argument to the contrary. An argument that can be made for
adoption of the broad view is that the whole purpose of enacting
section 1144(b)(1) was to prevent ERISA from being applied ret-
roactively. Although this argument has merit, it also has a flaw. If
the narrow view is taken and the benefits are denied after 1975, it
would not really be retroactive because the "act or omission" would
have taken place after the effective date. Therefore, this argument
alone will probably not be strong enough to sway the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court decides to resolve the issue, it is likely to
follow the narrow view. The purpose of ERISA is to protect the
interests of participants in plans by providing ready access to the
federal judiciary.11 9 In light of the discussion above, the narrow view
is much more likely to achieve this purpose. It is also more likely
to result in equitable treatment of litigants. The broad view places
a heavy burden on participants to inquire about benefits long before
retirement. Trustees will not act upon a participant's claim until the
claim is made; therefore, the act of denying a claim will invariably
involve a post-ERISA interpretation. It makes sense to allow these
participants the protection of ERISA.
It may be argued that time eventually will take care of the prob-
lem because in a number of years all the plans in effect will be
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
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subject to ERISA. Therefore, the argument might continue, it would
be a waste of judicial resources to have a Supreme Court ruling
now. However, this argument must fail. Many people are presently
being treated unequally. Depending on the circuit the worker lives
in, he or she may or may not be subject to the protections of ERISA.
These inequities are more likely to continue because there are a
substantial number of pre-1975 plan participants still working and
participating in plans today. If the conflict is not solved, there is
always a chance that a court may go back and find that a person
is still not subject to the protections of ERISA. It does not make
sense to enact a statute in 1975 which may not afford protection
to workers in the 1990's. Judicial economy is important, but a Su-
preme Court decision is needed. And the Court should not clear its
docket at the expense of justice. A judicial burial of the conflict is
long overdue.
Bradley H. Layne
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